When the supreme court interprets a law, can it ignore the ordinary meaning of words? Of course!

What term would you use to describe someone who demanded that you call an apple "an orange,"--and then proceeded to blythely make it the law of the land that anyone who refused to comply could have their business destroyed, or could be fired from their job?

I suspect most Americans would call anyone who dared make such a demand either crazy or a monster.

The U.S. supreme court (lower case deliberate) has done that.  Not just once but dozens of times over the years.  They're f'd up monsters, yet beloved by Democrats and socialists because virtually all their insane rulings favor Dems and socialists. 

I want to show you one such RULING, from June of last year.  Only by knowing about it do you have a chance of understanding how totally these monsters have f'd up our country. 

Supreme court "opinions"--actually RULINGs that have the force of law--are written in a way that's extremely hard for normal mortals to understand.  Apparently even the court understands this, so they've started using a legal reporting service to translate the meaning for the rest of us.  But the actual ruling clearly states that this summary "constitutes no part of the Opinion of the Court."  As you'll see, this will be important later.

The case is captioned "Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia," but it also ruled on two other cases.  In two of the cases the plaintiffs were employees who claimed they'd been fired for being homosexuals (the court often uses the soothing, politically-correct "gay"), while the third case involved a person hired as a male who later demanded the right to keep his job though now dressing like a woman.

The parties concede that the term “sex” in 1964 referred to the biological distinctions between male and female.   And “the ordinary meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of.’  That term incorporates the but-for causation standard, meaning that a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to a challenged employment action.  

[The court holds that the above definitions produce] the following rule: An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex. It makes no difference if other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision.... A statutory violation occurs if an employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee. Because discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status....

Wait...what?  The court apparently agreed that in 1964, when the Civil Rights act was passed by congress (which is supposed to be the outfit that makes these things called "laws"), "sex" "referred to the biological distinctions between male and female."  But with the last three words in yellow above, the court has stealthily, cunningly, broadened the agreed definition of "sex"--which a paragraph earlier was admitted to be "the biological distinctions between male and female"--to add "transgender status."

In Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] Congress outlawed discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  Today we must decide  whether an  employer can fire someone simply for being homosexual or transgender.  The answer is clear.  An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.   Sex  plays  a  necessary  and  undisguisable  role  in  the  decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.  

Did you see the switch?  It was both fast and fairly subtle, so if you missed it don't feel bad.  But you need to read that last 'graf again.  The "opinion"--actually new law--starts by acknowledging that "Congress outlawed discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race, color, religion, sex...."  but then in the 4th line adds the new law:  After "...for being homosexual..." Alito adds "...or transgender."

Of course "or transgender" isn't in the Civil Rights act, neither in Title VII nor anywhere else.  So do the judges thing congress intended trannies to be part of the protected class?  If so, where do the judges find even a hint that congress contemplated or intended this result?

In the very next 'graf the opinion (actually new law) acknowledges the legal difficulty of doing this.

Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act ["those who adopted" = congress?] might not have anticipated their work would lead to this particular result.  Likely, they weren’t thinking about many of the Act’s consequences that have become apparent over the years.... 

I.e. "rulings we judges have made up, even though not contemplated or anticipated."

...including its prohibition against discrimination on the basis of motherhood or its ban on the sexual harassment of male employees.  But the limits of the drafters’ imagination supply  no  reason  to  ignore  the  law’s  demands.    When  the  express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest.  Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit. 

Wait...y'say "Only the written word is the law"?  And yet this RULING you rat-bastards issued totally CHANGES the law.  So how do you get from "Only the written word is the law" to "...or transgender" becoming a protected class by virtue of the meaning of the word "sex"?  

Great question, eh?  And the "opinion" begins reasonably:

This Court normally interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment.  After all, only the words on the page constitute the  law adopted by Congress and approved by the President.  If judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract from old statutory terms...we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the people’s  representatives.  And we would  deny people the right to continue relying on the original meaning of the law they have counted on to settle their rights and obligations.

With this in mind, our task is clear.  We must determine the ordinary public meaning of Title VII’s command that it is “unlawful... for an employer to refuse to hire, or to [fire] any  individual...because of such individual’s race,  color,  religion,  sex,  or  national  origin.”

To do so, we orient ourselves to the time of the statute’s adoption, here 1964, and begin by examining the key statutory terms.... and then confirming our work against this Court’s precedents.

Ah.  So how did they use that method--what was it again?  Oh yeah: "we orient ourselves to the time of the statute's adoption (1964)..." to arrive at their new, trendy, preferred, politically-hip definition of "sex"?  Watch:

We proceed on the assumption that [in 1964] “sex” [referred] only to biological distinctions between male and female.  Still, that’s just a starting point.  The question isn’t just what “sex” meant,...

Really?  Seems like that was and is exactly the question.  But you're a black-robed elite, so this is the kind of "reasoning" we expect.  But do go on.

...but what Title VII says about it.  [It] prohibits employers from taking certain actions “because of” sex.  
   In the language of law this means that Title VII’s  “because of” test incorporates the  “simple” and “traditional” standard of "but-for causation"...[which] is established whenever a particular outcome would not have happened but for the purported cause.    
   In other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes.  If it does, we have found a but-for cause.

When it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision. So long as the plaintiff ’s sex was one cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law.

Didja catch the switch that time?  Sure.  A moment ago the judge writing the "opinion" NEW LAW admitted that the case hinged on the ordinary, "public" meaning of the term "sex" as understood and contemplated in 1964.  But in just three sentences the judge writing the "opinion" NEW LAW changed the entire thrust to "does anything in this case have anything at all to do with sex?  If so, you may ignore the meaning of the term "sex" and use another test entirely: the "but-for" test. 

In other words, the court has neatly sidestepped the definition of "sex," instead getting people to focus on the idea that because the term "homosexual" contains "sex," then the court will decree that the issue is "the plaintiffs wouldn't have been fired but for their 'sex,'" the exact definition of which no longer matters. 

To grasp the audacity of this switch, imagine a case in which the Democrats wanted to make a brilliant 30-year-old immigrant their nominee for president.  Applying the reasoning used in the above opinion, the supreme court could as easily rule that the Constitution's clear mandate that to be president one had to be at least 35 years old and a natural-born citizen really wasn't the right test, because we've--in our far more enlightened age--everyone agrees that "we're a nation of immigrants," and that "18-year-olds can vote, so surely the Founders wouldn't have denied them..."  You get it.

The tranny case is a bit more of a stretch--although both are child's play for those determined to achieve their desired result.  See, claiming to be a member of the opposite sex clearly has something to do with "sex," so using the same reasoning as before, there's no need to have any concern about what congressmen thought sex meant in 1964.  That "but-for" test overrides the ordinary meaning of "sex.."  See?  Easy peasy, citizen.

And as an aside, the opinion always uses female pronouns to refer to the transgender plaintiff, giving legal ratification to the biological impossibility.  It's another indicator of where the court's sympathies lie, and that the court's RULING is predetermined, regardless of the law.

The ruling in these cases was so goofy, so unsupported by both the statutory wording and the legislative intent, that the court was forced to do some real inversions to ignore both.  One is moved to wonder why the court didn't followed the legally-sound path it set up--to apply the ordinary meaning of "sex" in 1964.  Of course that would have caused the court to rule for the employers.  Ah, can't have that, eh?

But seriously, it's hard to see how this was about anything other than supporting a politically-desired result.  And sadly, the court's history is absolutely full of such rulings.  See "Kelo v. City of New London" or "Filmore v. Hardwick" for two similar examples of the court totally perverting logic and the Consitution to support decisions favorable to one political party.

This ruling will be cited to force schools to allow men to compete against women in womens' sports.  Similar reasoning has already been used to permit same-sex couples to adopt, and to bar religious adoption agencies from participating in state adoption programs unless they enthusiastically embrace that practice.

To see the actual court ruling, click here.